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Abstract
Method factors represent variance common to indicators from the same data source. Detecting method factors can help
uncover systematic bias in data sources. This article employs confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to detect method factors in
23 democracy indicators from four popular data sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House, Polity IV,
and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Using three different multi-dimensional concepts of democracy as start-
ing points, we find strong evidence for method factors in all sources. Method-specific factors are strongest when yearly
changes in the scores are assessed. The sources find it easier to agree on long-term average scores. We discuss the impli-
cations for applied researchers.
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1. Introduction
Are measures of political regime characteristics system-
atically influenced (or biased) by the institutions that
created them? We answer this question by assessing
whether democracy indicators coming from the same
source exhibit common deviations not found in indi-
cators originating from other sources. Kenneth Bollen
(1993) referred to these common deviations as ‘method
factors’. That is, we assess whether democracy indicators
are affected by method factors.
Method factors should be of concern for the applied
researcher because method factors can be a sign of sys-
tematic bias in the data source, i.e., ‘method bias’. But
biased indicators do not just lead to improper descrip-
tions of the issue to be measured. Even erroneous con-
clusions can be drawn from inferential studies if bias in
a democracy indicator is correlated with an explanatory
variable such as economic liberalization or ethnic frag-
mentation. In a field with immediate policy implications
such as democratization research, false conclusions can
cause actual harm. There is peril in informing policy with
biased indicators.
This decade has seen a renewed interest in measur-
ing democracy and explaining why it succeeds in some
places and fails in others. The interest was sparked by ini-
tially promising signs of liberalization in the Middle East,
now known as the Arab spring, as well as by formally
democratized countries backsliding into autocratic prac-
tice. Such backsliding has occurred prominently in Russia,
Turkey and Venezuela, but also in member states of the
European Union, such as Poland and Hungary.
Responding to the desire to better track these devel-
opments, several newproducers of democracy data have
come forward. Certainly, the most notable addition to
the group of democracy data producers is the Varieties
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of Democracy (V-Dem) project. It boasts thousands of ex-
perts who have been involved in coding a new dataset on
democracy for almost all countries since 1900. ‘Most [ex-
perts] have lived in their countries of expertise for nearly
thirty years, and at least 60 percent are nationals of that
country’ (Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, & Teorell, 2014,
p. 162). The size and diversity of V-Dem’s expert group
contrasts with existing data sources, such as the Polity
IV project or the FH data, which rely on a much smaller
number of experts who are predominantly citizens of the
United States. This difference in expert groups raises the
questionwhether V-Demdata differs systematically from
existing data sources.
The suspicion that traits of the expert group could
influence indicators has already been voiced by Bollen
(1993, p. 1213). He lists political attitudes of coders, in-
complete information, and the aggregation of individual
indicators into indices of democracy as potential sources
of method bias. All of these issues are present to vary-
ing degrees in all social science indicators. One might
assess these issues from varying perspectives, examin-
ing underlying concepts, data collection and aggrega-
tion procedures.
In this article, we focus on the indicator scores that
the sources produce. We employ a ‘convergent/diver-
gent validation’ approach (Adcock & Collier, 2001,
p. 540): indicators from one source representing a par-
ticular conceptual dimension of democracy should be
similar to indicators from other sources representing the
same dimension—they should converge. Indicators from
the same source representing different conceptual di-
mensions of democracy should not be as similar—they
should diverge to some degree.
Our specific strategy is inspired by Bollen’s seminal
1993 article ‘Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method
Factors in Cross-National Measures’. He employs con-
firmatory factor analysis (CFA). His model allows a
range of indicators to load on two latent dimensions of
democracy—political liberties and democratic rule—and
on latent factors representing the sources of the indica-
tors. This enables him to assess the amount of systematic
error that indicators from the same source exhibit, i.e.,
the method factors. The sources he considers are Arthur
Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive as well
as Freedom House’s Freedom in the World and Freedom
in the Press. Bollen’s analysis has not been updated with
current democracy indices. Giebler (2012, p. 510) argues
that most approaches comparing democracy measures
focus excessively on conceptual differences, rather than
on methodological differences. A study that has paid
much attention to systemic bias in democracy ratings
in the past decade is Pemstein, Meserve and Melton’s
(2010, pp. 444−446) presentation of theirUnified Democ-
racy Scores.What distinguishes their approach fromours
is that they employ top-level indices that attempt to cap-
ture democracy as a whole. Also, Treier and Jackman
(2008), in an attempt to detectmeasurement error in the
Polity data, employ a unidimensional model.
Our contribution to the literature is an update and ex-
tension to Bollen’s approach that evaluates various mea-
sures of regime characteristics that have been used as in-
dicators of unidimensional or multidimensional concep-
tualisations of democracy. We update his approach by
employing an updated set of four sources and 23 indi-
cators and three different conceptual frameworks in our
analysis. We extend his approach by using data with tem-
poral variation over the period 2006 to 2014 (and 1972 to
2014 for an alternative dataset with three sources). Tem-
poral variation provides us with the ability to provide a
more nuanced assessment: do sources agree on average
on grading countries by traits of democracy and do they
agree about the timing and direction of the changes tak-
ing place over time?
The main result of our analysis is that most if not all
measures of regime characteristics under study exhibit
method factors. That is, these measures are influenced
to a non-ignorable degree by the sources or institutes
that produce them. The objectivity of these measures
is thus limited. This is particularly salient when one con-
siders changes over time in democracy indicators: differ-
ent sources make very different assessments on changes
in political and civil rights. In the cross-sectional view,
however, sources show less pronounced method fac-
tors and more substantial agreement. Considering indi-
vidual sources,method factors are largest for someof the
Polity IV indicators.
2. Background: Three Concepts of Democracy
Our aim is to examine whether current measures of
democracy are affected by the institutions or research
groups by which they are produced or by the data
sources from which they are derived. To ensure that our
findings regarding the existence of method factors do
not depend on a particular conception of democracy, we
check for the existence of method factors against the
backdrop of each of three different conceptualisations: a
two-dimensional one, which has already been employed
in Bollen’s (1993) study, a three-dimensional conceptu-
alisation put forward by the V-Dem project (Coppedge,
Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning,& Teorell, 2017a), and finally
a conceptualisationwith no less than four dimensions, in-
spired by Merkel (2004).
Bollen’s two-dimensional scheme entails political lib-
erties and democratic rule. This approach is rather min-
imalist and introduces only one distinction: between in-
dividuals’ abilities to participate in the political system,
and the functioning of the latter in the spirit of democ-
racy. Using this approach has the advantage of making
our analysis comparable to Bollen’s. The dimensions are
defined as follows: Political liberties ‘exist to the extent
that the people of a country have the freedom to ex-
press a variety of opinions in anymedia and the freedom
to form or to participate in any political group’ (Bollen,
1993, p. 1208). Democratic rule ‘(or political rights) ex-
ists to the extent that the national government is ac-
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countable to the general population, and each individual
is entitled to participate in the government directly or
through representatives’ (Bollen, 1993, p. 1209).
Since we have more indicators available than Bollen
had in 1993, we can test more detailed models. V-Dem
suggests a scheme which entails seven ‘principles’ of
democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, majoritarian,
consensual, deliberative and egalitarian (Coppedge et al.,
2017a, pp. 20−25). We employ only the first three princi-
ples here and exclude the latter four. We exclude majori-
tarian and consensual, as these principles do not have
a more democratic and a less democratic pole (Lijphart,
2012)—rather they refer to variations of democracy
which most measurement projects do not tap into. Mea-
suring majoritarian and consensual principles across all
countries is challenging, and even V-Dem abstains from
quantifying these concepts at the moment (Coppedge
et al., 2017a, p. 24). We exclude the deliberative prin-
ciple because it refers to the rationality of political de-
bates, which is not measured directly by other sources.
We exclude the egalitarian principle because it refers to
individual socio-economic prerequisites for political em-
powerment, which includes financial resources and thus
seems to overstretch the concept of democracy.
The electoral principle of V-Dem captures the core
idea of polyarchy, i.e., ‘making rulers responsive to citi-
zens through periodic elections’ (Coppedge et al., 2017a,
p. 20). The liberal principle refers to individual rights
against state repression, guaranteed by ‘constitutionally
protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effec-
tive checks and balances that limit the use of executive
power’ (Coppedge et al., 2017a, p. 21). The participa-
tory principle ‘embodies the values of direct rule and
active participation by citizens in all political processes’
(Coppedge et al., 2017a, p. 22). ‘Direct rule’ entails prob-
lems similar to that encountered in the majoritarian and
consensual principles: more direct rule does not nec-
essarily imply more democracy, and may erode into a
tyranny of the majority. Moreover, most sources abstain
from measuring issues of direct democracy separately.
We thus focus on ‘active participation’ as conceptual fo-
cus of this dimension.
A more detailed theoretical model which is indepen-
dent of our data sources is Wolfgang Merkel’s (2004)
concept of ‘embedded democracy’. Embedded democ-
racy has an electoral regime at its core, which is com-
plemented by political liberties, civil rights, horizontal ac-
countability, and the effective power to govern (Merkel,
2004, p. 37). Referring to Dahl (1971), Merkel (2004,
p. 38) describes the electoral regime to entail ‘universal,
active suffrage, universal, passive right to vote, free and
fair elections and elected representatives’. Political rights
‘complete the vertical dimension of democracy andmake
the public arena an independent political sphere of ac-
tion, where organizational and communicative power is
developed’ (Merkel, 2004, p. 38). This requires freedom
of association and freedom of expression. Political rights
provide the input for the electoral regime, which would
be lacking input without the former. Civil rights main-
tain the rule of law by containing state power. ‘The ac-
tual core of the liberal rule of law lies in basic constitu-
tional rights’ (Merkel, 2004, p. 39). This requires an in-
dependent judiciary as a guarantor. Civil rights thus con-
stitute negative rights in the political system, whereas
political rights constitute positive rights. Merkel refers
to Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) with the definition of
horizontal accountability, which requires ‘that elected
authorities are surveyed by a network of relatively au-
tonomous institutions’ (Merkel, 2004, p. 40). This is nec-
essary since the vertical forms of control provided by
the three preceding institutions ‘control the government
only periodically’. The effective power to govern finally
asserts that the elected representatives are actually in
control of the state (Merkel, 2004, p. 41). We disregard
this last requirement here, as only a few sources attempt
to measure it.
3. Data
The data sources we consider beyond V-Dem are the
Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) democracy index
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014), Freedom House (FH;
Freedom House, 2016) and the Polity IV project (Mar-
shall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2016). As Bollen (1993, p. 1210)
does, we focus on subjective measures, i.e., indicators
of de facto democratic quality, not de jure provisions.
The former are also more susceptible to systematic bi-
ases and deserve a closer inspection in this regard. Both
this focus and the limited coverage of other sources ex-
plain why we constrain our analysis to four sources at
the present.
Other sources were excluded for providing discrete
regime types instead of linear measures of regime status
(e.g. the Democracy-and-Dictatorship data by Cheibub,
Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010), for measuring de jure instead
of de facto regime traits (e.g., the Database of Political In-
stitutions by Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, & Walsh, 2001),
or for providing insufficient spatial or temporal coverage
(e.g., the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2016). The
Appendix lists additional sources that were excluded and
gives reasons for these decisions.
Each data source considered here provides at least
two levels of indicators: those at the lowest level, which
are coded directly (by judgement, observation or other
means), and those at intermediate and higher levels,
which are aggregated from lower-level indicators. We
employ data at an intermediate level of aggregation, i.e.,
indicators that are supposed to measure rather general
attributes of democratic rule and political liberties, such
as fair elections and freedom of speech. Disregarding
very detailed indicators such as those provided by V-Dem
allows us to maintain a roughly equal level of aggrega-
tion across sources, although a perfect alignment is not
possible. The selection of the indicators and their assign-
ment to conceptual dimensions is documented at length
in the Appendix.
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The indicators are collated into two data sets: a
‘longer’ data set which includes a smaller range of indi-
cators for which data are available for a relatively long
period, from 1972 to 2014, and a ‘shorter’ but ‘wider’
data set which includes a wider range of indicators for
which data are available only for the relatively short pe-
riod from 2006 to 2014. The ‘longer’ data set, to which
we refer to as D1, contains 5,864 observations from
160 countries for 15 indicators, while the ‘shorter’ data
set, referred to as D2, contains 1,070 observations from
157 countries for 23 indicators. The EIU’s democracy data
and detailed indicators are only available formore recent
years and appear in D2, but not in D1.
The following results focus on D2. Results pertaining
to D1 confirm the general findings from D2 and can be
found in the Appendix. A description of D2 is given by Ta-
ble 1, which indicates the source of the indicators and
what dimensions they represent according to concep-
tualisations of political regimes with different numbers
of dimensions. The Appendix also provides tables with
summary statistics for both datasets. All data was ob-
tained via theQuality of Government database (Teorell et
al., 2017) and the V-Dem dataset version 7.1 (Coppedge
et al., 2017b).
Table 1. Indicators and dimension assignment in data set D2.
Description Source 2-Dimensional 3-Dimensional 4-Dimensional
concept concept concept
Civil liberties EIU Political liberties Liberal principle Civil rights
Electoral process and pluralism EIU Democratic rule Electoral principle Electoral regime
Functioning of government EIU Democratic rule Liberal principle Horizontal accountability
Political participation EIU Political liberties Participatory principle Political rights
Associational and Organizational FH Political liberties Participatory principle Political rights
Rights
Electoral Process FH Democratic rule Electoral principle Electoral regime
Freedom of Expression and Belief FH Political liberties Liberal principle Civil rights
Personal Autonomy and FH Political liberties Liberal principle Civil rights
Individual Rights
Political Pluralism and Participation FH Democratic rule Liberal principle Political rights
Rule of Law FH Political liberties Liberal principle Civil rights
The competitiveness of participation Polity Democratic rule Participatory principle Political rights
(PARCOMP)
Regulation of participation (PARREG) Polity Political liberties Liberal principle Political rights
Executive constraints (XCONST) Polity Democratic rule Liberal principle Horizontal accountability
Competitiveness of executive Polity Democratic rule Electoral principle Electoral regime
recruitment (XRCOMP)
Openness of executive recruitment Polity Political liberties Participatory principle Political rights
(XROPEN)
Civil society participation V-Dem Political liberties Participatory principle Political rights
Freedom of association (thick) V-Dem Political liberties Electoral principle Political rights
Freedom of expression (thick) V-Dem Political liberties Liberal principle Political rights
Judicial constraints on the executive V-Dem Democratic rule Liberal principle Horizontal accountability
Equality before the law and V-Dem Political liberties Liberal principle Civil rights
individual liberty
Equal protection index V-Dem Political liberties Liberal principle Civil rights
Clean elections V-Dem Democratic rule Electoral principle Electoral regime
Legislative constraints on V-Dem Democratic rule Liberal principle Horizontal accountability
the executive
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4. Method
If measures of political regime characteristics are sys-
tematically influenced by the institutions that created
them, then measures coming from the same institution
should be more correlated than those coming from dif-
ferent institutions, at least after taking into account that
these measures reflect certain substantive dimensions
of regime characteristics. Equivalently, the variation of
a measure of regime characteristics can be decomposed
into a portion that can be attributed to a variation along
conceptual dimensions such as, e.g. democratic rule and
political liberties, and a portion that has to be attributed
to the influence of the institution that created the mea-
sure. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is the method of
choice to examine whether such a decomposition is pos-
sible and adequate. In the context of confirmatory factor
analysis this decomposition will take the form:
Xi = 𝛼i + 𝜆ijFj + 𝜅ikGk + Ui (1)
where Xi is the value of the i-th regime characteristics
indicator, Fi is the (unobserved) value of a common fac-
tor that represents the j-th conceptual dimension, Gk is
the (unobserved) value of the common factor that rep-
resents the influence of the k-th institution, and Ui is a
unique factor that represents random measurement er-
ror specific for the i-th indicator. For brevity, in the fol-
lowingwewill refer to a common factor that represents a
conceptual dimension of regime characteristics as a con-
ceptual factor, while we refer to a common factor that
represents the influence of the institution that created
the indicator as a method factor.1 The coefficient 𝜆ij of
the conceptual factor Fj is referred to as the loading of
indicator Xi on this factor. It is a parameter that is esti-
mated in the context of a confirmatory factor analysis
and represents how much the variation of the regime
characteristics indicator is influenced by the conceptual
factor. The coefficient 𝜅ik of the method factor Gk, which
also can be referred to as a loading, is an estimated pa-
rameter that represents how much the indicator is influ-
enced by the institute that has created it. Finally, 𝛼j is an
intercept that reflects the fact that, while the means of
the common factors and the unique factor are assumed
to be zero, the mean of Xi may be different from zero.2
Figure 1 illustrates a decomposition of the four indica-
tors X1, X2, X3, and X4, into two conceptual factors F1 and
F2, and into two method factors G1 and G2. The loadings
in equation (1) are represented by arrows in Figure 1 as
is the influence of the unique factors U1, U2, U3, and U4,
which are represented by the empty circles. Figure 1 also
illustrates some additional assumptions that we make in
our analysis: firstly, thatmethod factors are uncorrelated
and that unique factors are uncorrelated, while concep-
tual factors may be correlated. These assumptions are
motivated by the following considerations: the fact that
one can distinguish between concepts such as Demo-
cratic rule and Political liberties does not imply that they
are empirically uncorrelated. On the other hand, if the
method factors are supposed to reflect influences that
are specific to the institutions that create the indicators,
this is best reflected by assuming the method factors to
be uncorrelated. Otherwise, if we allowed the method
factors to be correlated, such correlations would reflect
commonalities among indicators of different institutions,
which in turn could be attributed to the fact that they
are supposed to measure the same phenomena or dif-
ferent aspects of the same phenomena. That is, allowing
method factors to be correlated could contaminate them
with correlations among indicators created by the sub-
stantial factors. As a consequence, this would lead to an
overestimation of the relevance of method factors. Con-
versely, if fixing the correlations betweenmethod factors
leads to an underestimation of the impact of method fac-
tors, then this means erring on the side of caution.
Confirmatory factor analysis does not only allow the
estimation of factor loadings, variances, covariances,
and correlations.More importantly, it allows the compar-
ison of different models in terms of their fit to empirical
data. Such model comparisons form the core of our re-
search design. In order to assess the relevance ofmethod
factors, we conduct model comparison likelihood ratio
tests with models which contain method factors against
models which do not contain model factors. Such mod-
els can be obtained by deleting the term𝜅ikGk fromequa-
F1 G1
X1
X2
X3
X4
F2 G2
Figure 1. An Illustration of a factor model with concep-
tual factors and method factors.
1 In factor analytic variants of multi-trait-multi-method analysis one would restrict the meaning of the term ‘method factor’ to common factors that
represent the effects of a particular method of measurement. Since the influence of the creating institution on the regime indicators may be largely a
consequence of the particular methods employed by this institution, we find it justifiable to use the term ‘method factor’ in a somewhat wider sense.
If we had used a term like ‘institutional factor’ this might have led to confusion with conceptual factors that refer to institutional aspects of regime
characteristics.
2 Confirmatory factor analysis per se does not distinguish between different types of common factors. The distinction between two types of common fac-
tors, as reflected in different symbols used for the factors and their loadings, is a matter of interpretation that guides the construction of a factor model.
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tion (1) and by deleting the nodes labelled G1 and G2 in
Figure 1 as well as the arrows that connect them with
the nodes labelled X1, X2, X3, and X4. The null hypoth-
esis in these likelihood ratio tests is that a model with-
out the method factors fits the data as well as a model
that includes method factors. If a likelihood ratio test
leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis, this means
that an improvement of model fit brought about by the
inclusion of method factors is more than a product of
chance,which in turn provides evidence for the existence
of method factors.
In order to make sure that our results are robust, we
conduct our hypothesis tests based on the three differ-
ent conceptualisations of the dimensionality of regime
characteristics. That is, in the first variant the model that
represents the null hypothesis has the two conceptual
factors Democratic rule and Political liberties, in the sec-
ond variant, the nullmodel includes the three conceptual
factors Electoral principle, Liberal principle, and Partici-
patory principle, and in the third variant the null model
includes the four conceptual factors Civil rights, Electoral
regime, Horizontal accountability, and Political rights.
Apart from the identification problems that always
lurk in complex CFA and structural equation models,
our analysis is confronted with three related challenges:
(1) non-normal and categorical indicators violate the
standard assumptions on which likelihood-based infer-
ence in confirmatory factor analysis is based; (2) many
indicators are conceptualised so that most democracies
receive top scores—they are ‘truncated’; (3) we observe
the same countries at several points in time, which intro-
duces dependencies not accounted for in standard CFA.
The first two challenges are illustrated by Figure 1:
many indicators in our dataset place few countries in
the centre of the empirical distribution and many at the
extremes, in contrast to the shape of a normal distri-
bution. Moreover, some of the indicators, in particular,
the indicators from the Polity project, only have a small
number of distinct values and therefore not have met-
ric quality. In a situation like this maximum likelihood
estimators may lose their asymptotic efficiency and test
statistics may lead to false positives. For situations such
as this Browne’s (1984) asymptotically distribution-free
estimator may retain asymptotic efficiency and provide
relatively accurate test statistics. However, Browne’s es-
timator requires a very large sample size, larger than
the size of the data sets we employ in our analysis. For
this reason, we stick to likelihood ratio test statistics and
report Bollen-Stine bootstrap-based p-values (Bollen &
Stine, 1992).
The second challenge is also illustrated by the his-
tograms in Figure 2: contemporary democracies may be
all too similar with respect to the regime indicators avail-
able in the data sets. Indicators such as Polity’s open-
ness of executive recruitment or V-Dem’s clean elections
show extreme peaks at the upper end of the scale. In
order to address this problem, we repeat our analyses
with subsets of the D1 and D2 data sets that contain
only those regimes classified as non-democracies accord-
ing to the democracy-and-dictatorship data (Cheibub et
al., 2010; updated by Bjørnskov & Rode, 2017). We ex-
clude all democracy regime types (codes 0 to 2) and re-
tain all non-democracies (codes 3 to 5). Such a restriction
of the data to non-democracies can eliminate some of
the strongly peaked or U-shaped appearances in the his-
tograms of the indicator variables, yet they still appear
clearly non-normal.
The third challenge is that we use panel data, where
measures are taken repeatedly from the same coun-
tries and therefore are not (conditionally) independent
from one another. The methodology of CFA and struc-
tural equation modelling is mostly developed with cross-
sectional data in mind, as is the available software to
estimate such models. The (serial) dependence of mea-
sures taken from identical countries may or may not lead
to biased estimates, but at least it will lead to inaccu-
rate inference if standard errors are constructed based
on the assumption of independence. We address this
challenge with two approaches adopted from the econo-
metrics of panel data (Baltagi, 2013): in a first approach,
we fit our models to between country cross-sectional
data constructed from the country-level means of the
regime measures. This country-level aggregate data has
a considerably smaller number of observations and thus
a smaller power, but the serial dependence of the mea-
sures is eliminated. In a second approach, we keep the
temporal information contained in the data and fit our
models towithin-country first differences of regimemea-
sures, i.e., to the amount of change compared to the pre-
vious year. This eliminates the between-country hetero-
geneity and reduces the serial dependence.
Considering four concepts with and without method
factors means that we will have to estimate eight mod-
els for each of the two data sets we are employing
(D1 and D2), both for a full version of each data set
and for the version reduced to non-democracies. In to-
tal, this gives 64 fitted models if we further distinguish
between-country cross-sections and within-country first-
differences. It is impossible to discuss the estimates
based on this many model fits in a single article. Instead,
we only discuss a series of chi-squared tests for model
comparisons and present estimates only for models with
four conceptual factors and four method factors fitted to
data set D2. All models are estimated using the package
lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) in the statistical environment R
(R Core Team, 2017).
5. Results
As explained in the previous section, we conduct model
comparison likelihood ratio tests to obtain evidence
about the presence of method factors that represent the
influence of the institutions on the regime indicators that
they create. Each likelihood ratio test compares a model
that contains only conceptual factors, common factors
that represent only conceptual dimensions of regime
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 92–104 97
00.
00
0.
10
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.
20
2
EIU: Civil
liberes
4 6 8 10
0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.
6
1
Polity: The
compevenes of
parcipaon
(PARCOMP)
2 3 4 5
0.0
0.
0
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2.
0
V-Dem: Civil
society
parcipaon
0.4 0.8
0.0
0.
0
2.
0
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 3.
0
V-Dem: Freedom of
associaon (thick)
0.4 0.8 0.0
0.
0
2.
0
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
V-Dem: Freedom of
expression (thick)
0.4 0.8 0.0
0.
0
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
V-Dem: Judicial
constraints on the
execuve
0.4 0.8
0.0
0.
0
1.
0
0.
5
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1.
5
V-Dem: Equal
protecon index
0.4 0.8 0.0
0.
0
2.
0
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
V-Dem: Clean
elecons
0.4 0.8 0.0
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
V-Dem: Legislave
constraints on the
execuve
0.4 0.8
0.0
0.
0
2.
0
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 3.
0
V-Dem: Equality
before the law and
individual liberty
0.4 0.8
0
0.
0
0.
4
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2
Polity: Regulaon
of parcipaon
(PARREG)
3 4 5
0
0.
0
0.
5
1.
5
1.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1
Polity: Openness of
execuve recruitment
(XROPEN)
2 3 4
0
0.
00
0.
10
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y 0.
20
2
FH: Associaonal
and Organizaonal
Rights
4 6 8 10
1
0.
0
0.
4
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2
Polity: Execuve
constraints
(XCONST)
3 4 5 6 7 0.0
0.
0
1.
0
2.
0
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Polity:
Compeveness of
execuve recruitment
(XRCOMP)
1.0 2.0 3.0
0
0.
00
0.
10
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.
20
2
FH: Electoral
Process
4 6 8 10 0
0.
00
0.
10
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
FH: Freedom of
Expression and
Belief
5 1510 0
0.
00
0.
08
0.
04
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
5 1510
FH: Personal
Autonomy and
Individual Rights
0
0.
00
0.
10
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
5 1510
FH: Polical
Pluralism and
Parcipaon
0
0.
00
0.
12
0.
06
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
5 1510
FH: Rule of Law
0
0.
00
0.
15
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0.
30
2
EIU: Electoral
process and
pluralism
4 6 8 10 0
0.
00
0.
10
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2
EIU: Funconing of
government
4 6 8 10 0
0.
00
0.
10
0.
20
Re
l. 
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
2
EIU: Polical
parcipaon
4 6 8 10
Figure 2. Histograms of the variables contained in D2 (N = 1,070).
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characteristics, with a model that additionally contains
method factors corresponding to the various institutes
that produced the indicators. If the likelihood ratio test
indicates that inclusion of method factors leads to a sta-
tistically significant improvement of model fit, then we
conclude that democracy measures indeed are affected
bymethod factors. In order to make sure that our results
are robust, we repeat the likelihood ratio test with differ-
ent conceptualisations of regime dimensions as a base-
line. Furthermore, we repeat the likelihood ratio tests
with respect to the complete set of countries as well
as only those countries categorized as authoritarian by
Cheibub et al. (2010) and Bjørnskov and Rode (2017). To
take into account the panel structure of the data, we con-
duct the tests first based on the between-country cross-
section (i.e. the country averages) of the regime indica-
tor values and second based on the within-country first
differences of the indicator values. Table 2 shows the re-
sults of the hypothesis tests based on between-country
cross-section while Table 3 shows the hypothesis tests
results based on within-country first-differences. In ad-
dition to the values of the likelihood-ratio statistics, Ta-
bles 2 and 3 show three goodness-of-fit indices: the com-
parative fit index (CFI) which varies between 0 and 1,
where 1 indicates perfect fit; the root mean square error
of approximation (RMSEA), which also varies between
0 and 1, but where a value below 0,05 indicates an ac-
ceptable fit; and the standardised root mean squared
residual (SRMR), which again usually varies between 0
and 1, with lower values indicating a better fit between
the model and the data.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 are clear: no matter
whether one assumes one, two, three, or four concep-
tual dimensions of regime properties, nomatterwhether
one considers all countries or only non-democratic ones;
the improvement of model fit by including method fac-
tors into the factor model is statistically significant at
any conventional level. Furthermore, the goodness-of-
fit indices also show a substantial improvement, except
for SRMR in section (b) of Table 2. In summary, we find
strong and robust evidence that method factors matter.
Having established the existence of method factors,
we should discuss their relevance. How strong is their in-
fluence onmeasures of regime properties? This question
can be answered by comparing the sizes of the loadings
of the regime measures on the conceptual factors with
their loadings on themethod factors. In order to take into
account the different scale lengths of the regime mea-
sures, such a comparison is best made using standard-
ised estimates that are rescaled so that common factors
and indicators all have unit variance. If the standardised
loading of a regime measure on a method factor is as
large as, or larger than, its loading on any conceptual fac-
tor then its validity should be considered questionable.
Figure 3 illustrates the factor loadings of the cross-
section of regime indicators in the model that fit the data
best, the factormodelwith four conceptual factors, and all
four method factors. Diamonds represent conceptual fac-
tors, circles represent method factors, and rectangles rep-
resent regimemeasures. Each factor loading in the model
is represented by an arrow, where the width indicates the
absolute size of the standardised loading.3 Overall, the
Table 2.Model comparison tests for the presence of method factors in data set D2 (between-country cross-section).
(a) All countries
Deviance Mod.Df Chi-squared Diff. Df p-value CFI RMSEA SRMR
1 Dimension 1419.8 253 0.813 0.171 0.055
+Method factors 891.9 230 527.9 23 0.000 0.894 0.135 0.045
2 Dimensions 1368.4 252 0.821 0.168 0.056
+Method factors 844.0 229 524.5 23 0.000 0.901 0.131 0.045
3 Dimensions 1395.8 250 0.816 0.171 0.055
+Method factors 859.4 227 536.5 23 0.000 0.898 0.133 0.045
4 Dimensions 1314.3 247 0.828 0.166 0.055
+Method factors 822.0 224 492.3 23 0.000 0.904 0.130 0.045
(b) Non-democratic countries only
Deviance Mod.Df Chi-squared Diff. Df p-value CFI RMSEA SRMR
1 Dimension 695.1 253 0.697 0.177 0.102
+Method factors 495.7 230 199.5 23 0.000 0.818 0.144 0.120
2 Dimensions 677.7 252 0.708 0.174 0.102
+Method factors 460.6 229 217.1 23 0.000 0.841 0.134 0.114
3 Dimensions 693.7 250 0.696 0.178 0.101
+Method factors 499.6 227 194.2 23 0.000 0.813 0.146 0.088
4 Dimensions 624.5 247 0.741 0.165 0.099
+Method factors 438.9 224 185.6 23 0.000 0.853 0.131 0.104
3 Path diagram of the confirmatory factor analysis model with four conceptual and for method factors—within-country first differences.
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Table 3.Model comparison tests for the presence of method factors in data set D2 (within-country first differences).
(a) All countries
Deviance Mod.Df Chi-squared Diff. Df p-value CFI RMSEA SRMR
1 Dimension 4256.9 253 0.503 0.132 0.105
+Method factors 1478.5 230 2778.4 23 0.000 0.845 0.077 0.055
2 Dimensions 4236.5 252 0.505 0.132 0.106
+Method factors 1478.2 229 2758.3 23 0.000 0.845 0.077 0.055
3 Dimensions 4151.3 250 0.515 0.131 0.104
+Method factors 1403.1 227 2748.1 23 0.000 0.854 0.075 0.054
4 Dimensions 4111.2 247 0.520 0.131 0.104
+Method factors 1340.0 224 2771.2 23 0.000 0.861 0.074 0.061
(b) Non-democratic countries only
Deviance Mod.Df Chi-squared Diff. Df p-value CFI RMSEA SRMR
1 Dimension 3123.6 253 0.424 0.113 0.100
+Method factors 1140.7 230 1982.9 23 0.000 0.817 0.067 0.056
2 Dimensions 3106.7 252 0.427 0.113 0.102
+Method factors 1140.5 229 1966.2 23 0.000 0.817 0.067 0.057
3 Dimensions 3065.7 250 0.435 0.112 0.100
+Method factors 1126.4 227 1939.2 23 0.000 0.820 0.067 0.055
4 Dimensions 2977.3 247 0.452 0.111 0.102
+Method factors 1016.8 224 1960.5 23 0.000 0.841 0.063 0.073
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loadings of the regime measures on the conceptual fac-
tors are larger in absolute value than the loadings on the
method factors. This is good news in so far asmost regime
measures indeed mostly represent substantial regime as-
pects. Yet, some of the loadings on the method factors
are quite large. This affects, in particular, the regime mea-
sures from the Polity project: the indicators XRCOMP and
XROPEN have strong loadings on the method factor. Even
the relatively novel V-Dem measures do not seem to be
without problems. All political rights indicators have rela-
tively strongmethod factor loadings, and both Civil society
participation and Freedom of association have small load-
ings on the conceptual factor. It appears that V-Dem con-
tradicts more traditional sources on the relative position
of countries in terms of political rights.
Figure 4, which illustrates loadings from a factor
model fitted to within-country first differences, delivers
an even less comforting message: the loadings on the
method factors appear at least as large as the loadings
on conceptual factors, thus raising doubts regarding the
validity of many of the regime measures—at least when
it comes to adequately representing change of regime
properties within a country.4 In particular, the Freedom
Housemeasures appear to bemuchmore affected by the
corresponding method factor than by any of the concep-
tual factors. Also, some of the Polity measures show very
strong loadings on the method factor. In general, these
strong loadings indicate that there is much less consen-
sus between the various sources in terms of change than
in terms of the average character of a country. This ap-
pears to affect the Political rights and Civil rights factors
in particular, and much less so the Electoral regime and
Horizontal accountabilitymeasures. A potential explana-
tion for this pattern is that the latter refer to institutional
characteristics that are rather easily observable in the
form of laws and regulations, while changes of (effective)
civil and political rights are unobservable latent proper-
ties and therefore more prone to follow a source’s bias.
How can we make sense of the divergent assess-
ments of method factors in democracy indicators that
the two Figures suggest? One interpretation is that the
different producers of democracy indicators vary in their
sensitivity to change within countries—some adjust in-
dicators earlier, others later (cf. Lueders & Lust, 2017).
Method factors are less salient when it comes to coun-
try averages because the producers eventually converge
to similar assessments once the dust raised by changing
regime properties has settled. An alternative interpreta-
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4 One should not be misled by the all negative loadings on the Civil rights factor. This is empirically equivalent with a model fit where all loadings on this
factor (and also the covariances with the other factors) have their signs reversed.
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tion of the small loadings on the dimension factors in the
within-country models is that within-country changes (in
particular in civil and political rights) occur not all at the
same time but in waves. As a consequence, the covari-
ances between first differences would understate the ac-
tual patterns of changes. Alas, the large sizes of method
factors make such a benevolent interpretation less likely.
Moreover, the temporal dependence of indicators
from the same source has a plausible explanation: if
a data producer comes to the conclusion that a larger
regime change is occurring, they may also form the ex-
pectation that several indicators portraying different as-
pect of the regime would change at once. A desire to
maintain consistency in regime measures may thus in-
crease the correlation between indicators created by the
same producer and decrease the correlationwith regime
measures created by other data producers.
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
Having analysed democracy indicators from four differ-
ent sources, we find strong evidence for systematic de-
viations, i.e., method factors. The question of whether
these method factors constitute biases in all cases, or
whether one source is simply closer to measuring ‘true’
democracy cannot be answered here. We can state that
while most sources converge on cross-sectional varia-
tion, they diverge on temporal variation within coun-
tries. Much of this uncertainty is not random error affect-
ing individual indicators, but systematic error driven by
the source.
As we analyse cross-sectional and within-country
variation separately, we can render our speculations
on the origins of this systematic error more precisely.
Sources agree much more on the cross-sectional data
than on the within-country differences.5 This is a pic-
ture that could be explained by a practice of ‘guessing
until convergence’. Measuring change in democracy is
difficult—in particular in the ‘softer’ dimensions of politi-
cal and civil rights. When one data producer, at a certain
point in time, perceives a change in a country, but others
do not, agreement on the affected dimension declines.
If those perceived changed stand the test of time, other
data producers will follow and also adjust their scores.
If the democratic practice observed in the country does
not seem towarrant the change in scores, the firstmover
will revert their scores. As a result, we see substantial
agreement in average cross-sectional assessments over
the entire time period that we investigate. But we do
not see much agreement on the timing of changes. It
would be interesting to investigate whether a particular
source is better at predicting change—a potential ‘super-
forecaster’ among democracy index producers.
Looking at individual sources, the largest method fac-
tors can be observed for some of the Polity IV indicators.
This may in part be explained by the divergent concep-
tual setup of the Polity indicators: in the Appendix, we
discuss the assignment of the indicators to the concep-
tual dimensions, and these decisions are more ambigu-
ous for the Polity indicators. For example, Polity focuses
more on the logic of ruler selection and less on partici-
pation, as exemplified by the neglect of suffrage issues
(Munck & Verkuilen, 2002, p. 11). Freedom House ex-
hibits less bias on the cross-section, but it on average
it fares worst of all sources when assessing changes. In
this light, Freedom House’s self-declared mission ‘to de-
fend human rights and promote democratic change’,6
could inspire speculation that temporal distortions in
Freedom House data are indeed intentional, with the
aim to spur regime change. Previous studies have con-
firmed an ideological bias of this source (Giannone, 2010;
Steiner, 2016). There is less critical literature on V-Dem
yet, as most published work using the dataset comes
from the large project team itself. The V-Dem team has
also shown a large effort to assess and improve the qual-
ity of their data. For example, it has presented a compar-
ison of its aggregate polyarchy score (a summary mea-
sure of electoral democracy) with other high-level in-
dices (Teorell, Coppedge, Skaaning, & Lindberg, 2016,
pp. 28−31). Nonetheless, some V-Dem indicators exhibit
sizable method factors and should be investigated. We
can say little about the EIU’s democracy index beyond
a diagnosis of moderate method factors, as hardly any
complementary research on this source is available.
For applied researchers, our results shall serve as a
reminder to adhere to some well-known but not always
heeded rules of good practice. In a nutshell, these are
(1) use the best source available, (2) use several sources,
and (3) use meta indices. Determining the best sources
available always depends on the research question at
hand. An indicator with high conceptual validity for a par-
ticular application should certainly not be replaced with
a more reliable measure that is far less valid. Contex-
tual specificity matters (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 534).
Among our set of indicators, however, we have many
close matches that claim to measure very similar issues.
In that case, given our results, our best guess for the in-
dicator least affected by method bias will usually be the
indicator provided by the V-Dem project. This is based
not only on our model estimates but also on what we
know about how the data is generated.
This scenario leads us to the second recommenda-
tion: should several indicators be available, use them!
There is little additional effort in using multiple indica-
tors to assess the robustness of results. Data collections
such as those published by theQuality of Government In-
stitute provide a large variety of indicators merged ready
for the end user.
The third recommendation requires more prepara-
tion: the use of meta indices. For democracy as a unidi-
mensional concept, various estimates exist. A prominent
example based on a Bayesianmeasurement model is the
5 Also note that the failure to agree on changes is all the more disappointing since we are employing yearly data, not monthly or weekly assessments.
6 Available at https://freedomhouse.org/our-work
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Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein et al., 2010). For
sub-dimensions of democracy, there are fewer meta in-
dices available. Examples beyond Bollen’s (1990) original
approach are the contestation and participation scores
provided by Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado (2008).
In order to provide more choice on meta indices for sub-
dimensions of democracy, one could employ the very fac-
tor scores that our models produce. This would provide
quantitative measures for the dimensions of the Bollen
concept, the V-Dem concept, and the Merkel concept.
However, before using these in applied research, com-
prehensive additional vetting will be required, as validly
measuring a substantial concept ismore demanding than
validly detecting method bias.
Our advice to producers of democracy indicatorswho
pursue the goal of unbiased measures of democracy is
to further address issues of method bias along all stages
of the measurement process with various methodolog-
ical approaches (see McMann, Pemstein, Seim, Teorell,
& Lindberg, 2016 for an example) and with reference
to alternative sources. Coppedge et al. (2017a), for ex-
ample, have taken first steps to compare V-Dem to its
main competitors. Additional efforts to more precisely
assess temporal change in unobservable traits of democ-
racy are advised.
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